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 Many philosophers of the last century thought that all moral judgements can be expressed 
using a few basic concepts ± what are today called the µthin¶ moral concepts, such as µgood,¶ 
µbad,¶ µright,¶ and µwrong.¶ This was the view, first, of the non-naturalists whose work dominated 
the early part of the century, including Henry Sidgwick, G.E. Moore, W.D. Ross, and C.D. 
Broad. Some of these philosophers recognized only one basic concept, usually either µought¶ or 
µgood¶; others thought there were two. But they all assumed that other moral concepts, including 
µthick¶ ones such as the virtue-concepts µcourageous¶ and µkindly,¶ can always be reductively 
analyzed using one or more thin concepts and some more or less determinate descriptive content. 
This was also the view of many non-cognitivists who wrote later in the century, including C.L. 
Stevenson and R.M. Hare. They thought judgements using thin terms express one or two basic 
moral attitudes, either pro or con and with distinctive formal features such as categoricity and 
universality, and that any thick terms can be reduced to thin ones plus some description. 
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 In recent decades a contrary view has emerged that claims that thick concepts are 
irreducible. According to its proponents, terms like µcourageous¶ and µkindly¶ have both morally 
evaluative and descriptive meaning, but the two interpenetrate each other in a way that makes the 
separation a reductive analysis requires impossible. Thick concepts are therefore not derivative 
from thin ones, which do not have the primacy the above-mentioned philosophers assumed. On 
the contrary, on some versions of this anti-reductive view it is the thick concepts that are primary, 
with the thin ones mere abstractions from them.2 
 The mark of a thin concept like µright¶ is that it says nothing about what other properties 
an item falling under it has. If moral properties supervene on non-moral ones, as most 
philosophers accept, then any act that is right will have other, non-moral properties that make it 
right. In addition, if moral judgements are universalizable, as the non-naturalists and 
non-cognitivists believed, then any other act with the same non-moral properties will likewise be 
right. But while the claim µx is right¶ says or implies that x has some right-making properties, it 
says nothing about what in particular they are. If we know the other evaluations someone who 
asserts this claim has made, we may be able to guess what right-making properties he has in mind 
now; if we know the general evaluative practices of his culture, that may also help. But these 
speculations go beyond the semantic content of µx is right¶ itself, which says only that some 
properties of x make it right without specifying what they are. The reductive view therefore 
analyzes µx is courageous¶ into an evaluative component that does not say anything about x¶s 
non-moral properties and a descriptive component that does. The anti-reductive view says this 
separation is impossible. 
 In this paper we will defend the reductive view of thick concepts by answering the most 
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common argument against it, and in so doing will defend a position held by more philosophers 
than the recent literature suggests. This literature has tended to associate the issue about thick 
concepts with that between cognitivist and non-cognitivist accounts of moral judgement, as if the 
reductive view were essentially non-cognitivist and therefore one all cognitivists must deny.3 
Now, it is indeed essential to any non-cognitivist view to separate evaluation sharply from 
description and so to require some reduction of thick concepts; an attack on reductivism is 
therefore also an attack on non-cognitivism. But the historical record shows cognitivists like 
Sidgwick and Moore just as much as non-cognitivists like Stevenson taking the reductive line. 
Nor do we see the slightest inconsistency in combining the cognitivist view that moral 
judgements express beliefs with the reductive view that they all use a few thin concepts. So while 
non-cognitivism is committed to some version of the reductive view, cognitivism can either 
accept that view or reject it. Our defence of the view will therefore discuss the relation between 
thick and thin concepts in a way that is neutral between cognitivist and non-cognitivist accounts 
of either, and will propose analyses that can be used by non-cognitivists and reductive 
cognitivists alike. 
  The case against the reductive view is commonly credited to John McDowell, but there 
are two separate arguments detectable in his writing. A first, or µuncodifiability,¶ argument 
claims, on the basis of Wittgensteinian ideas about rule-following, that moral judgements cannot 
be codified in general principles; part of this argument grants that the moral supervenes on the 
non-moral but denies that moral judgements are universalizable.4 Though we will return to this 
argument later, it will not be our prime focus, because we do not see how on its own it bears on 
the thick/thin issue. McDowell¶s uncodifiability claim presumably applies to all moral 
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judgements, those using thin concepts as much as those using thick ones. If judgements about 
courage and kindliness cannot be formulated in general principles, surely neither can ones about 
what is good, right, or µthe thing to do.¶5 But if uncodifiability applies equally to thick and thin 
concepts, how can it support any conclusion about the relation between them? If judgements 
using both kinds of concept resist principles, it may be that there are no reductive relations 
between them, but it also may be that there are. Assume that thin judgements are uncodifiable 
and that thick ones are reducible to thin ones plus some description. Then the uncodifiability of 
the thick judgements simply follows: the uncodifiability of the thin concepts transfers to the thick 
concepts in whose analysis they figure, so the latter are uncodifiable just because and in so far as 
the former are. Assuming the uncodifiability of the thin, then, the uncodifiability of the thick is 
precisely what the reductive view predicts; uncodifiability alone does not tell against that view 
but is perfectly consistent with it.6 
 McDowell¶s other argument does bear on the thick/thin issue and is repeated without 
reference to uncodifiability by many later writers. This µdisentanglement¶ argument starts by 
assuming that any reductive analysis of a thick concept will have a particular form, which we will 
call a µdescriptively determinate two-part form.¶ This analysis contains, first, a descriptive 
component that fully determines the concept¶s extension, identifying descriptive properties that 
decide, as unambiguously as such properties ever do, what does and does not fall under it. It then 
adds an evaluative component that commends or condemns items for having those properties, so 
the general form of the analysis is µx has descriptive properties A, B, and C (for specific A, B, 
and C), and is good/bad/right/wrong for doing so.¶ On this view a thick concept is an ordinary 
descriptive concept with an evaluation added on. Now, this pattern of analysis may be 
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appropriate for a derogatory term like µKraut,¶ which has the fully determinate descriptive 
meaning µis a German¶ and adds condemnation of any German for being one. But McDowell 
argues that it is inadequate to capture the thick concepts of moral interest, including 
virtue-concepts such as µcourageous¶ and µkindly.¶ It implies that one can always identify the 
extension of a thick term using only its descriptive part and without any knowledge of the 
evaluations a speaker uses it to make. But this disentanglement, McDowell claims, is impossible 
for virtue-terms such as µcourageous,¶ whose extension depends crucially on evaluations. He 
writes: 
Consider, for instance, a specific conception of some moral virtue: 
the conception current in a reasonably cohesive moral community. 
If the disentangling manoeuvre is always possible, that implies that 
the extension of the associated term, as it would be used by 
someone who belonged to the community, could be mastered 
independently of the special concerns which, in the community, 
would show themselves in admiration or emulation of actions seen 
as falling under the concept. That is: one could know which actions 
the term would be applied to, so that one would be able to predict 
applications and withholdings of it in new cases ± not merely 
without oneself sharing the community¶s admiration (there need be 
no difficulty about that), but without even embarking on an attempt 
to make sense of their admiration.7 
Since that is impossible for terms such as µcourageous,¶ McDowell concludes that the reductive 
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view is false. 
 This disentanglement argument is repeated by Bernard Williams in the discussion that 
introduced the terminology of µthick¶ and µthin.¶ He too assumes that any reductive analysis will 
have a descriptively determinate two-part form, so it treats a thick concept as µa conjunction of a 
factual and an evaluative element¶ and analyzes any statement using it as saying µsomething like 
³this act has such-and-such a character, and acts of that character one ought not to do.´¶ He then 
says it follows that, for any concept so analyzed, µyou could produce another that picked out just 
the same features of the world but worked simply as a descriptive concept, lacking any 
prescriptive or evaluative force.¶ Against this he argues, citing McDowell, that µcritics have made 
the effective point that there is no reason to believe that a descriptive equivalent will necessarily 
be available,¶ so to know the extension of a thick concept one must also grasp µits evaluative 
point.¶8 And the same appeal to disentanglement without reference to uncodifiability is made by 
later critics of the reductive view such as Jonathan Dancy, Hilary Putnam, Charles Taylor, and 
Christine Tappolet.9 
 Whatever McDowell¶s initial intentions, then, the disentanglement argument apart from 
claims about uncodifiability has become the most common anti-reductive argument in the 
literature. We think this is no accident. However well it reflects aspects of McDowell¶s overall 
metaethical view, the uncodifiability argument has premises about rule-following and against 
universalizability that are controversial and would be questioned not only by reductivists but also 
by many with no settled opinion on the thick/thin issue. The argument is therefore unlikely to 
persuade many not already on the anti-reductive side. But the disentanglement argument does not 
have this flaw. Its key premise, that we cannot determine the extension of a thick concept without 
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making some evaluations, does seem neutrally acceptable and even compelling, and in this paper 
we will grant it for the important thick concepts. So if it were true that the reductive view cannot 
accommodate this premise, that would be strong evidence against it. This has surely been a key 
part of the disentanglement argument¶s appeal: that it derives an anti-reductive conclusion from a 
premise even reductivists will find it hard to deny.10 
 But it is not true that the reductive view cannot accommodate this premise. Like too many 
arguments in philosophy, the disentanglement argument considers only the most simple-minded 
version of an opposing view and takes a refutation of that to refute the view as a whole. 
McDowell, Williams, and those who follow them all explicitly assume that any reductive 
analysis of a thick concept will have what we call a descriptively determinate two-part form. We 
concede that the argument is persuasive against analyses with this form, and also concede that 
such analyses have been given by several reductivists, in particular the non-cognitivists 
Stevenson, Hare, and Simon Blackburn.11 But the obvious question is whether the reductive view 
is restricted to this type of analysis, and we think the obvious answer is that it is not. There are at 
least two patterns of analysis the view can use, either separately or together, to capture 
McDowell¶s premise while still reducing thick concepts to thin ones plus description. 
 Before we describe these patterns, we should emphasize the limited aim of our project. 
We are not giving a complete defence of the reductive view nor a complete refutation of 
everything anti-reductivists have said. We are just answering one anti-reductive argument, 
though it has been a highly influential one. And since this argument denies that the reductive 
view can, even using its own resources, accommodate a compelling claim about thick concepts, 
we will feel free, in answering it, to help ourselves to those resources. Thus, if reductivists 
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typically assume universalizability, we will feel free to use universalizability in our analyses even 
though some on the other side reject it. 
 The first pattern of analysis is very straightforward. We have discussed two types of 
concept: at one extreme is a thin concept like µgood,¶ which says nothing about the good-making 
properties of items falling under it, at the other extreme is a descriptively determinate concept 
like µKraut,¶ which specifies those properties completely and therefore fully determines the 
concept¶s extension. Surely there is room between these extremes for a category of thick (or 
µthick-ish¶) concepts whose descriptive component specifies good- or right-making properties to 
some degree but not completely, saying only that they must be of some specified general type but 
not selecting specific properties within that type ± that is left to evaluation. Or, to put the point 
slightly differently, there can be concepts whose descriptive component defines an area in 
conceptual space within which admissible good- or right-making properties must be found, so 
any use of the concept associating it with properties outside that area is a misuse, but does not 
identify any specific point within the area as uniquely correct, as a concept like µKraut¶ does. The 
concept therefore has descriptive content, but this content is not completely determinate. The 
pattern of this analysis is something like µx is good, and there are properties X, Y, and Z (not 
specified) of general type A (specified), such that x has X, Y, and Z, and X, Y, and Z make 
anything that has them good.¶ This pattern is reductive, because it uses only the thin concept 
µgood¶ and the descriptive concept µA.¶ But it accommodates the key premise of the 
disentanglement argument because determining which properties of type A are the good-making 
ones, which we must do to determine the concept¶s extension, requires evaluative judgement. 
 To illustrate this pattern, consider the term µjust¶ in the specific sense used in discussions 
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of distributive justice. And imagine two people who disagree about what makes for distributive 
justice, one saying that just distributions of, say, happiness are equal distributions, while another 
says they are distributions proportioned to people¶s merits, which can be unequal. If the reductive 
view had to use a fully determinate two-part analysis of µdistributively just,¶ it would have to say  
that these two people use different concepts of justice. For the egalitarian, µx is just¶ means µx is 
an equal distribution, and good for being so,¶ while for the desert-theorist it means µx is a 
distribution proportioned to merit, and good for being so.¶ It would not follow that the two 
cannot disagree about distributive justice, since the claims their respective concepts imply about 
the basis of goodness in distribution contradict each other. But in debating the justice of a 
particular distribution they could not be disagreeing about whether a single concept applies to it, 
since they use different concepts. But does it not look as if they are disagreeing about the 
application of a single concept? And is an analysis not preferable that allows this? 
 We can construct such an analysis if we use the first pattern of analysis and give 
µdistributively just¶ an only partly determinate descriptive component. Then µx is distributively 
just¶ will mean something like µx is good, and there are properties X, Y, and Z (not specified) 
that distributions have as distributions, or in virtue of their distributive shape, such that x has X, 
Y, and Z, and X, Y, and Z make any distribution that has them good.¶ This analysis places 
significant restrictions on the extension of µdistributively just.¶ If someone says an act of 
generously helping a stranger is distributively just, she is misusing the concept, because only 
distributions can be just in this sense. And if she calls a distribution just because it was brought 
about by generous actions, she is likewise misusing the concept, because only a distribution¶s 
properties as a distribution can bear on its justice. But these restrictions do not completely 
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determine the concept¶s extension, and in particular do not determine whether it contains equal 
distributions or ones based on desert.  That depends on which properties of distributions are in 
fact good-making, so the analysis captures McDowell¶s premise. To know the intended extension 
of µdistributively just¶ as used by some person or community, it is not enough to know the 
descriptive part of that term¶s meaning; we must also know what evaluations they use it to make, 
that is, which properties they take to make distributions good. And to know the term¶s actual 
extension, we must know which properties in fact make distributions good.12 
 For another illustration of this pattern, consider the concept µselfish¶ in a sense that 
concerns acts apart from their motivations and indicates a specific ground of wrongness. (We 
analyze a different and perhaps more common sense of µselfish¶ that does concern motivations 
using our second pattern below.) Here µx is selfish¶ will be analyzed as something like µx is 
wrong, and there are properties X, Y, and Z (not specified) that acts have in virtue of somehow 
bringing about the agent¶s happiness rather than other people¶s, such that x has X, Y, and Z, and 
X, Y, and Z make any acts that have them wrong.¶ There again can be competing views about 
what the relevant X, Y, and Z are. A strict impartialist will say that any act is wrong that prefers 
the agent¶s own happiness to the greater happiness of others, so it is selfish to choose 10 units of 
happiness for oneself over 11 units for others. But those who grant an µagent-centred prerogative¶ 
permitting each person to prefer his own somewhat lesser happiness will be more sparing in their 
use of the term: preferring 10 units of one¶s own happiness to 11 units of another¶s will not be 
selfish, because it is permitted by the prerogative, while preferring 10 to 1000 will.13 The 
descriptive part of this analysis again places some restrictions on the term¶s extension: one 
cannot call an act that causes gratuitous harm or shows a lack of self-respect µselfish.¶ But these 
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restrictions do not fully settle the term¶s extension, and in particular do not decide between the 
impartialist and agent-centred views. That depends on which specific property of preferring one¶s 
happiness is wrong-making, which is again an evaluative matter.14 
 We do not claim that the analyses of concepts like these have a uniquely correct content. 
Return to the case of µdistributively just¶ and imagine a utilitarian who says that just distributions 
are those that result in the most happiness. Is this a legitimate use of the concept? The answer 
depends on whether the descriptive content of µdistributively just¶ allows as good-making 
properties of distributions only their intrinsic properties ± in which case this use is a misuse ± or 
also their causal ones. There seems to us no settled truth about this; here the concept¶s 
boundaries become vague. And this seems to be mirrored in the term¶s usage. Faced with the 
above utilitarian, some (mostly other utilitarians?) will say he is offering a legitimate rival view 
of distributive justice, others that the best description of the view is that it dispenses with justice. 
We think there are similar vaguenesses, even at multiple points, in many other thick concepts. 
But there is also always some determinateness: to call an act µdistributively just¶ because it 
resulted from generous actions is clearly to misuse the concept, while to call it µjust¶ because it is 
equal is clearly permitted. 
 This first pattern of analysis places concepts like µdistributively just¶ and µselfish¶ in a 
middle position between purely thin ones and fully thick ones such as µKraut.¶ In so doing it 
explains why anti-reductivists like McDowell have to assume that any reductive analysis of these 
concepts will have a descriptively determinate two-part form. It is only if the descriptive part of 
the analysis fully determines a concept¶s extension that there is no room for evaluations to help 
do so. Given an only partly determinate descriptive part, however, that room is clearly available. 
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 That there are concepts between the purely thin and fully thick, so instead of a sharp 
division there is a smooth continuum, is also noted by Samuel Scheffler, though he does not 
question these concepts¶ irreducibility.15 But something essentially equivalent to our first pattern 
of analysis has been proposed by Allan Gibbard in his answer to the disentanglement argument. 
Gibbard¶s candidate thick judgement is µx is lewd,¶ which he analyzes as follows: 
µL-censoriousness [a special feeling of shock and censure that goes with finding something lewd] 
toward the agent is warranted, for passing beyond those limits on sexual display such that (i) in 
general, passing beyond those limits warrants feelings of L-censoriousness toward the person 
doing so, and (ii) this holds either on no further grounds or on grounds that apply specially to 
sexual displays as sexual displays.¶16 The reference to limits on sexual display in this analysis 
gives the descriptive meaning of µlewd,¶ and Gibbard emphasizes that this meaning is only partly 
determinate. It rules out applying µlewd¶ to an act of beating one¶s wife or acting intellectually 
arrogant, but it does not specify what the relevant limits are and therefore cannot by itself 
determine the term¶s extension. That depends also on the term¶s evaluative meaning, but 
Gibbard¶s specification of this incorporates three aspects of his more general metaethical theory 
that may make his central point harder to see. One is his view that all moral concepts, including 
thin ones such as µright¶ and µwrong,¶ can be analyzed in terms of the warrant or appropriateness 
of certain feelings. The second is that there is an irreducible plurality of such feelings, so what is 
appropriate to lewd acts is not some generic con-attitude but a specific attitude of 
L-censoriousness. (Here Gibbard departs from the classical non-cognitivists, who thought there 
was only one basic pro- and one basic con-attitude.) And the last is his non-cognitivist view that 
judgements about warrant do not state truths but express one¶s acceptance of certain norms. In 
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our discussion, we are abstracting from issues about cognitivism vs. non-cognitivism and treating 
the thin concepts as unanalyzable. And if we remove the elements of Gibbard¶s analysis that 
depend on his specific metaethics, we get something like the following: µx is lewd¶ means µx is 
wrong, and there are properties X, Y, and Z (not specified) that involve somehow passing beyond 
limits on sexual display, such that x has X, Y, and Z, and X, Y, and Z make any act that has them 
wrong.¶ That is essentially our analysis.17 
 The central point of Gibbard¶s analysis has been recognized by one anti-reductivist, 
Jonathan Dancy, but he dismisses it. To Gibbard¶s claim that a thick term does not have enough 
descriptive meaning to determine its extension, Dancy replies: 
I just don¶t understand the notion of µnot enough descriptive 
meaning.¶ Any amount of descriptive meaning is enough 
descriptive meaning to be the whole meaning of some term, even if 
it does not make for a very interesting or useful one. If a term has 
descriptive meaning, its descriptive µaspect¶ is capable of standing 
alone as a neutrally descriptive concept.18 
But consider the descriptive meaning of µx is distributively just¶: µthere are some properties X, Y, 
and Z (not specified) that distributions have as distributions, or in virtue of their distributive 
shape, and x has X, Y, and Z.¶  It implies that x is a distribution and can therefore be said to 
determine an extension, namely one including all and only distributions. But this is not the 
extension of the term µdistributively just.¶ To specify that extension we have to add an evaluative 
judgement saying which X, Y, and Z are good-making and therefore which distributions are just. 
Dancy simply repeats the basic error behind the disentanglement argument, assuming that if the 
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descriptive part of a thick concept does any work in determining its extension it has to do all the 
work. But the point of the analysis that we, like Gibbard, have proposed is that even if the 
descriptive part of a thick concept determines some extension, it does not contain enough to 
determine that concept¶s extension. 
 This first pattern of analysis fits many thick concepts, but we do not believe it is adequate 
to capture virtue-concepts such as µcourageous¶ and µkindly.¶ This is important, because these 
concepts have been central to the anti-reductive case. They call for a second pattern of analysis, 
which likewise reduces thick concepts to thin ones plus description but does so in a different 
way. 
 This second pattern involves a three-part analysis, because it supplements the global thin 
evaluation that governs the whole concept (the µx is good ...¶ or µx is right ...¶ of the first pattern) 
with a further thin evaluation that is embedded within the descriptive content. Its presence means 
that we cannot determine the extension of the thick concept without determining the extension of 
the embedded thin one, that is, without making some evaluations. 
 To illustrate this second pattern, consider the virtue of integrity. It is a morally good trait 
that involves, roughly, sticking to one¶s ideals and projects despite temptations or distractions. 
But not any fidelity to a project counts as integrity. Someone who persists in building his 
beer-mat collection despite the rise of Nazism around him and the temptation to fight against it 
would hardly be described as acting with integrity. The reason is that only fidelity to good or 
important goals counts as integrity. An initial analysis of µx is an act of integrity¶ therefore runs 
something like µx is good, and x involves an agent¶s sticking to a significantly good goal despite 
distractions and temptations, where this property makes any act that has it good,¶ and where the 
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second µgood¶ indicates an embedded evaluation. Given this analysis, we can only know what 
counts as integrity if we know which goals are independently good, and there can be disputes 
about this. Consider a pope who remains faithful to the views on homosexuality and the 
ordination of women that he and his church have long held, despite calls from modernizers 
within and outside the church for change. Supporters of traditional Catholic teaching may say his 
resistance to reform shows integrity; those who reject that teaching will not. 
 Or consider courage, often cited by non-reductivists as a paradigm thick concept. It 
involves accepting harm or the risk of harm to oneself, but not all accepting of harm is 
courageous. The stand of the Spartan soldiers at Thermopylae was courageous, but resisting a 
robber¶s demand for µA nickel or your life¶ is foolhardy. And the difference between the two 
seems obvious. Accepting harm is courageous when the reasons, and especially the moral 
reasons, for doing so outweigh the reasons against, and it is foolhardy when they do not. In many 
though not all cases these reasons concern the goods that can be achieved by risking the harm. 
The stand of the Spartan soldiers was courageous because the good of preserving Greek 
civilization against Persian invasion was far greater than the evil of the soldier¶s deaths, while 
resisting the robber is foolhardy because retaining one¶s nickel is trivial compared to one¶s death. 
So for these cases µact x is courageous¶ can be analyzed as something like µx is good, and x 
involves an agent¶s accepting harm or the risk of harm for himself for the sake of goods greater 
than the evil of that harm, where this property makes any act that has it good,¶ and where, again, 
the second µgood¶ is an embedded evaluation. Given this analysis, it is impossible to determine 
the extension of µcourageous¶ without knowing what count as good goals, a topic about which 
there can again be disagreements. Imagine someone who sacrifices her career to make a purely 
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symbolic protest against a wrong her company has committed, a protest that will lead to no 
further benefits. Those who think symbolic acts have significant value in themselves may 
describe her act as courageous; those who recognize only instrumental reasons for acting will call 
it foolhardy. 
 We think this three-part analysis applies very widely, since many and even all virtues and 
vices involve a relation to some independently given moral consideration, often (though not 
always) an independent good or evil. Thus, benevolence involves a desire for another¶s good and 
malice a desire for his evil, with the extension of these concepts depending on what in particular 
is good or evil. Since most people regard happiness as good, most count a desire for another¶s 
happiness as benevolent. But what about a desire that she know important truths even when 
doing so will not affect her happiness? If knowledge is good apart from its effects, then this 
desire may count as benevolent; if not, it cannot. Something similar holds for the virtue of 
distributive justice. It is the trait of desiring and trying to bring about just distributions, and we 
cannot tell which people have it unless we know which distributions are just, for example, 
whether they are equal or based on desert. Or consider the vice of cruelty, which Hilary Putnam 
says the reductive view cannot accommodate. Like McDowell and Williams, he assumes that a 
reductive analysis of cruelty will have a descriptively determinate two-part form, and considers 
the suggestion that its descriptive part will read µcauses deep suffering.¶ Against this he writes: 
Before the introduction of anaesthesia at the end of the nineteenth 
century, any operation caused great pain, but the surgeons were not 
normally being cruel, and behaviour that does not cause obvious 
pain at all may be extremely cruel. Imagine that a person 
 17 
debauches a young person with the deliberate aim of keeping him 
or her from fulfilling some great talent! Even if the victim never 
feels obvious pain, this may be extremely cruel.19 
Putnam¶s first objection in this passage requires just an obvious refinement to the descriptive part 
of the analysis. As a vice-concept, cruelty turns on the motives behind an act rather than its 
causal consequences; otherwise a falling rock could be cruel. And if this part reads µcausing great 
pain either from desire for the pain for its own sake or with indifference to it,¶20 the 
nineteenth-century doctors were not being cruel. More importantly, his second objection is met 
by replacing the specific reference to pain in the analysis with an embedded evaluation. If cruelty 
involves causing some evil from desire or with indifference, and a young person¶s failing to 
develop her talents is either an evil or the deprivation of a great good, then the debaucher¶s act is 
indeed cruel. What Putnam says cannot be captured is perfectly easily explained. 
 Many virtues involve not just one attitude but a combination of attitudes that are properly 
proportioned to their objects¶ values, as their opposing vices are not. Thus courage involves 
caring more about a greater good such as preserving Greek civilization than about the lesser evil 
of one¶s death, while cowardice involves the opposite. Similarly, unselfishness involves properly 
balanced desires for one¶s own and others¶ goods, which on the most common view are desires 
that weigh the two equally. The contrary vice of selfishness, which involves caring too much 
about one¶s own good, differs from the selfishness analyzed earlier using the first pattern, since it 
concerns a person¶s motivations and not the rightness or wrongness of his acts. Imagine that 
someone prefers 10 units of his own happiness to 11 units for another person. His motivation is 
on the view we are currently considering somewhat selfish, and therefore if not positively vicious 
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at least not ideally good. But if there is an agent-centred prerogative, his acting on this motivation 
may not be at all wrong: his act will be selfish in the sense concerned with vice but not in the one 
connoting wrongness. For all these virtues of proportion, however, the embedded evaluation 
concerns not a single value but a comparison among values, so the extension of the relevant 
concept depends on comparative judgements about which people can differ. Consider nepotism, 
which we take to be a vice involving a stronger preference for one¶s children¶s happiness over 
strangers¶ than the value relative to oneself of their happiness makes appropriate. Someone who 
thinks that from a parent¶s point of view her child¶s happiness has 10 times as much value as a 
stranger¶s will say that caring 20 times as much about the child¶s happiness is nepotistic; 
someone who thinks the relevant ratio is 30:1 will not. 
 These three-part analyses again capture McDowell¶s key premise, but in a way he does 
not envisage. When he says that to determine a thick concept¶s extension we must grasp 
evaluations of µactions seen as falling under the concept,¶21 he assumes that the only relevant 
evaluations govern the concept as a whole and apply to whatever falls under it, as the first 
evaluative component of our analyses does. Williams does the same when he talks of grasping a 
thick concept¶s µevaluative point¶ in the singular.22 But the second evaluative component does 
not function in this way. If we analyze compassion as sorrow at another¶s evil, the term µevil¶ 
does not apply to the sorrow; it applies to its intentional object. Similarly, if judging the 
Spartans¶ sacrifice to be courageous requires judging the preservation of Greek civilization to be 
good, that second evaluation concerns not the Spartans¶ act but its goal. It therefore, and 
importantly, has implications beyond the context of courage. If there are properties that made 
Greek civilization significantly good, they were worth promoting even when there was no threat 
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of war and no call for courage, so the embedded evaluation is relevant to many more than just 
courage-judgements. Similarly, the embedded evaluation for µintegrity¶ concerns not a person¶s 
sticking to his goal but the quality of that goal itself and so also has further implications, for 
example, for how much others should support his pursuit of it with money. 
 The idea that the virtue-concepts involve embedded evaluations is a distinctive one that 
we cannot defend fully here.23 But it was accepted and applied by all the early 20th-century 
reductivists. Responding to the suggestion that ethical theory should use irreducible 
virtue-concepts, Sidgwick says µour notions of special virtues do not really become more 
independent by becoming more indefinite; they still contain, though perhaps more latently, the 
same reference to µGood¶ or µWellbeing¶ as an ultimate standard.¶ This is especially clear, he 
says, when we contrast a virtue with its associated vice, for example, courage with 
foolhardiness.24 Sidgwick takes the relation to µgood¶ that defines the virtues to be causal, so they 
are traits that result in something good. This is also Moore¶s view in Ch. 5 of Principia Ethica, 
but elsewhere he applies virtue-terms to states with an intentional relation to the good, as in 
loving or admiringly contemplating something good. And that intentional relation is central to 
the accounts of virtue of Rashdall, Ross, and Broad. Rashdall grounds the goodness of virtue in 
the µidea of the intrinsic worth of promoting what has worth,¶25 where the second µworth¶ is an 
embedded evaluation, while Ross recognizes three forms of virtue: the desire to do what is right, 
the desire to bring into being something good, and the desire to produce some pleasure for 
another being, where that pleasure is good and the basis of a virtue only because it is good.26 
Each of Ross¶s three desires involves an intentional relation to something that falls under a thin 
concept, either rightness or goodness, and we cannot identify the resulting concepts¶ extensions 
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without first identifying the thin ones¶ extensions. 
 This second way of capturing the key premise of the disentanglement argument differs 
from the first, which involved partly determinate descriptive content, but the two can and often 
should be combined. We have said that many virtues and vices involve a relation to some 
independently given good or evil, but there can be disputes about what this relation is. Compare 
Sidgwick¶s view that the virtues involve a causal relation to something good with Rashdall¶s and 
Ross¶s view that they involve an intentional relation. We do not think the everyday concept of 
virtue mandates either one of these views in preference to the other; each gives a possible 
specification of a concept of virtue that is neutral between them, as the concept of distributive 
justice is neutral between egalitarian and desert-based specifications. An analysis of, say, µx is 
benevolent¶ will therefore say µx is good, and there is some relation R (not specified) that is a 
positive or favouring relation, such that x stands in R to something good, and standing in R to 
something good makes anything that does so good.¶ The exact extension of µx is benevolent¶ will 
then depend on which positive relation is good-making, and here the two views can come apart. 
Consider a world where the desire to cause others pleasure somehow regularly causes them pain. 
An intentional view like Rashdall¶s will call this desire benevolent and virtuous; a causal view 
like Sidgwick¶s will not. While each view uses the same partly determinate concept of virtue, 
each specifies it in a different way and therefore generates a different extension for µbenevolent.¶ 
 There can be further such indeterminacies that call for the first pattern. For a person¶s 
pursuit of a goal to show integrity or be courageous, must her goal be in fact good or is it enough 
if she believes it to be good, assuming her belief is (note the further embedded evaluation) 
non-culpable? Again the concepts of integrity and courage seem not to settle this issue, but 
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require us to decide evaluative questions. Moreover, many of the concepts discussed in 
connection with the first pattern of analysis also require the second. Justice, for example, is a 
good of distribution, but not all things are such that their distribution gives rise to issues of 
justice. If someone said it was unjust that some people have more hair on their forearms than 
others, he would, we take it, be misusing the concept. This is because only distributions of things 
that have value, either intrinsic or instrumental, raise questions of justice, and there can be 
disagreements about what these are. Someone with a purely spiritualist theory of value may deny 
that distributions of money can be unjust, because money has no significant value, but say that 
inequalities in access to religious teachers can; an atheist with materialist values may say the 
opposite. And this point holds even more strongly for a desert-theorist. Desert involves awarding 
goods to people in proportion to their merit, so to know what a particular desert-theorist takes to 
be distributively just we must know what specific goods he is thinking of distributing 
(happiness? money?) and what for him constitutes merit (virtue? economic contribution?) In fact, 
the analysis of many thick concepts will contain multiple points where the concept¶s extension 
depends on evaluations, some because its descriptive part is only partly determinate (the first 
pattern) and some because it contains embedded evaluations (the second). But all these 
evaluations will involve only thin concepts: they will concern what pattern makes a distribution 
good, what degree of preference for one¶s own happiness makes an act wrong, or which goals are 
good or better than others. 
 We are not committed to all the details of the above analyses, which are only sketches 
intended to illustrate the general resources the reductive view has. Nor, to repeat, do we take 
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everything anti-reductivists have said. We have tried to answer just one anti-reductive argument, 
namely the disentanglement argument, but it is commonly presented in the literature as if it were 
on its own decisive. We believe we have shown that this is not so. The argument starts from the 
premise that one cannot determine the extension of an interesting thick concept without making 
evaluative judgements, but if the reductive view is not restricted to descriptively determinate 
two-part analyses, it can happily agree. 
 This concludes our main discussion, but we will end by considering two possible 
anti-reductive responses to it. We will take these responses to concern the virtue-concepts, which 
have been central to anti-reductivism, and therefore mainly to address our second pattern of 
analysis. And we will assume that they grant this pattern¶s general form, that is, grant that 
virtue-concepts can be analyzed using embedded thin concepts. 
 Both responses appeal to the idea of uncodifiability, which they use to supplement claims 
about disentanglement. We have argued that on its own uncodifiability does not tell against the 
reductive view: if both thick and thin concepts are uncodifiable, the former can be reducible to 
the latter and uncodifiable precisely because of that reduction. But the responses we will now 
consider combine uncodifiability claims with ones about disentanglement to yield what they 
claim is a compound vindication of the anti-reductive view. 
 The first of these responses grants our second-pattern analyses but says their appearance 
is misleading. The analyses suggest that to determine whether, say, someone¶s sticking to a goal 
shows integrity we must first, and independently, determine whether his goal is simply and 
generally good. But this, the response says, gets things backward. To know whether his goal is 
good in the way relevant to integrity, or what the extension of µgood¶ in this context is, we must 
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appeal to independent and prior judgements about integrity. It is these thick judgements that 
determine the extension of the thin one about goodness rather than vice versa, so the thin one is 
not on its own codifiable. Something similar holds, the response continues, for other virtues. To 
know whether the goal a person accepts harm or risk to achieve is good, we must appeal to 
independent thick judgements about courage, and similarly for benevolence, unselfishness, and 
more. Our analyses suggest that thin judgements have priority over thick ones, but the opposite is 
true: it is thick judgements about the virtues that determine the truth of thin ones about what is 
good or right. 
 The reductive view can certainly grant that thick judgements are sometimes evidence for 
thin ones. If it is in general benevolent to desire other people¶s good, and also benevolent to 
desire their pleasure, then their pleasure must be good.27 But the view denies that this is the only 
way to arrive at thin judgements; they can also be made independently. And whatever comes first 
in the order of discovery, it is the embedded thin judgements that are prior in explanation. It is 
the fact that a goal is good that explains why a person¶s sticking to it shows integrity, not his 
action¶s showing integrity that explains why his goal is good; and the fact that Greece was worth 
preserving that explains why the Spartans¶ stand was courageous, not vice versa. 
 The anti-reductive view this response proposes is certainly logically possible, but we find 
its claims about the thin concepts deeply implausible. The view implies that we can have 
determined that a goal is good in the way that bears on courage, and determined that it is good in 
the way that bears on benevolence, yet not know whether it is good in the way that bears on 
integrity. For that we need independent thick judgements about integrity. We can even have 
determined that the goal is good in a way that is independent of thick concepts and relevant to 
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such thin questions as whether we ought to help someone else pursue it, say, by offering him 
money.28
 But we still cannot know whether it is good in the way relevant to integrity without separate 
judgements about integrity. (µI know this goal is worth dying for, but do not yet know whether it 
is worth sticking to despite distractions.¶) What reason is there to accept this radical pluralism 
about µgood¶? If the same thin concept appears in the analyses of all these virtues, should its 
extension not be determined in the same way in them all? And how does the view explain the 
obvious connections between the virtues? Surely if the Spartans¶ stand against the Persians was 
courageous, their refusal to abandon it in the face of offers of money would show integrity. The 
reductive view explains this connection easily: if the preservation of Greece was sufficiently 
good to make fighting for it courageous, it was sufficiently good to make sticking to it an 
instance of integrity. But how can the connection exist if the good relevant to integrity is different 
from that relevant to courage? Or, if it does exist, how can it be anything other than a 
coincidence? Something like the pluralism this response proposes might make sense given the 
original anti-reductive view that thick concepts blend descriptive and evaluative meaning in an 
indissoluble whole. Then integrity, benevolence, and courage would be irreducibly distinct 
concepts and it would be natural for their extensions to be determined differently. But if the 
analysis of each concept uses the same concept of goodness, should that concept not function in 
the same way in each? 
 This may for some suggest a return to the original anti-reductive view with its 
descriptive-evaluative blends and rejection of our patterns of analysis. But the question then is 
what the argument for that original view is. It cannot be just uncodifiability, for we have shown 
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that that is perfectly consistent with the reduction of thick to thin. Nor can it be just the 
disentanglement argument, since there are two answers to that. And without some positive 
anti-reductive argument, we see no reason not to accept the three-part analyses, and given those 
analyses, no reason not to think the extensions of their thin components are purely thinly 
determined. 
 The second response to our argument grants that the extensions of the thin concepts in 
our analyses are thinly determined, but holds that the virtue-concepts so analyzed are 
uncodifiable not at one but at two distinct points. One is in their embedded thin concepts, as we 
have discussed. But a second arises in the move from those concepts to the embedding thick 
ones. Even if we know the extension of µgood¶ as that bears on integrity, this response says, we 
cannot determine the extension of µintegrity¶ without making further evaluative judgements that 
themselves cannot be codified. And this second uncodifiability blocks the reduction of thick to 
thin.29 
 This is another logically possible anti-reductive view, but we again see no reason to 
accept it. It is more complex than any defended in the literature, since it involves two separate 
uncodifiabilities in a single concept. (There is no hint of this in McDowell, for example, since he 
does not consider embedded evaluations.) And the question as always is what the argument for 
the second uncodifiability is. It could again be the disentanglement argument: knowing the 
extension of µgood¶ and the descriptive meaning of µintegrity¶ is not sufficient to determine the 
extension of µintegrity,¶ which requires further evaluative judgements. But the reductive view can 
again accept the premise of this argument if it combines the second pattern of analysis with the 
first, as we have argued it often should. Then the descriptive content of µintegrity¶ will be only 
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partly determinate, saying, for example, that integrity involves sticking to a goal in a way 
somehow related to goodness while leaving it undetermined whether that relation is causal (as for 
Sidgwick) or intentional (as for Rashdall and Ross), and whether the goal must be in fact good or 
merely one a person non-culpably believes is good (with further specification then needed of 
µnon-culpably¶). Given a mixed analysis of this sort, there will already be a significant gap 
between the descriptive and thin evaluative content of a virtue-concept on the one hand and the 
concept as a whole on the other, due to the partial indeterminacy of the descriptive content. And 
evaluative judgements will be required to fill that gap, so the key premise of the disentanglement 
argument is again accommodated. A defender of the second response may say that not all the 
second uncodifiability can be captured in this way; there is more, and that more blocks any 
thick-thin reduction. But what is the argument for this claim? What reason is there to believe that 
more evaluative judgements are needed to determine the extension of µintegrity¶ than those 
allowed for by the mixed analysis, and what exactly are those judgements? At this point the 
anti-reductivist seems, to quote Aristotle, like someone µmaintaining a thesis at all costs.¶30 
 While there may be many versions of the anti-reductive view, our question has been what 
the argument is for adopting that view in the first place, and we have therefore considered the 
most common argument in the literature. It starts by assuming that any reductive analysis of a 
thick concept will have a particular, descriptively determinate two-part form. We grant that the 
argument succeeds against analyses of this form and also grant that some reductive theorists have 
given such analyses. But a serious critique of a philosophical view cannot consider only what its 
proponents have actually said; it must also ask whether there are better formulations the view 
could be given. We believe the anti-reductivists have not done this work. Just a little reflection 
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shows there are at least two forms a reductive analysis can take other than the descriptively 
determinate two-part one, and given these forms it is indeed true, on at least two possible 
grounds, that the extension of any interesting thick concept depends on evaluations. The key 
premise of the disentanglement argument does not tell against the reductive view but is perfectly 
compatible with it. Of course rebutting a common argument against a philosophical view does 
not count as making a positive case for that view. But we believe that if the reductive view¶s 
resources were more widely appreciated, it would be more widely embraced. 
 The issue about thick and thin concepts is philosophically important. If the anti-reductive 
argument we have discussed were sound, then all those metaethicists, cognitivist and 
non-cognitivist alike, who have taken their principal task to be that of understanding judgements 
like µx is good¶ and µx is right¶ would be fundamentally misguided. Likewise, all those normative 
ethicists who have formulated moral theories using µgood¶ and µright¶ ± all the utilitarians, 
perfectionists, deontologists, and more ± would have no clue how to think about ethics. These are 
very strong conclusions to draw from a brief argument about the extensions of moral concepts. In 
our view this argument rests on an uncharitable assumption about the view being opposed and, 
once that assumption is exposed, has not a shred of force. 
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